Should a benevolent social planner subsidise family size? Typically, contributions assuming exogenous fertility yield an a¢rmative answer, while those assuming endogenous fertility do not reach de…nite conclusions. We re-examine the endogenous fertility model, and …nd that when redistribution is accomplished mostly using non-income taxes, there is indeed a case for subsidising the number of children, as long as poor families tend to have more children. Instead, when redistribution is pursued prevalently using a non-linear income tax, the above rationale for children subsidisation disappears. We …nally argue that whether children are a tax asset or a tax liability depends however on all the policy instruments, and not only on the tax treatment of family size.
Introduction
It is commonly argued that children should be a tax asset to their parents. The policy practice of many governments is indeed to subsidise large families, either using per-child grants, or income tax allowances related to family size, or, more indirectly, a favourable tax treatment for children goods (e.g. reduced VAT rates for baby-food or clothes). A straightforward way of justifying this practice is to assume that children generate positive externalities or are a sort of merit good (see e.g. Cigno 1983 and Cigno et al. 2000) ; if the society values children more ¤ Correspondence to: Alessandro Balestrino, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Sede di Scienze Politiche, via Sera…ni 3, 56126 Pisa, tel. +39/050920437, fax +39/050920450, e-mail sandro@specon.unipi.it than individual parents do, then it is optimal to subsidise large families. We want to address here a di¤erent question, namely whether there is an economic rationale for subsidising children when i) the government respects the families' judgment of what is good for them, and ii) the economy is second-best only in the sense that distortionary taxes are used. More precisely, we will investigate whether a welfare-maximising government should devise the optimal tax system in such a way that children are subsidised. This is a question which has recently been studied by a number of authors. For instance, Cremer et al. (2000) , assuming exogenous fertility (i.e. that parents cannot decide how many children to have), argue that families with a large number of children should indeed receive a more favourable income tax treatment, the rationale for this being that large households face a higher total cost of children and should therefore be compensated by the tax system (see also Balcer and Sadka 1986) . Cigno and Pettini (2001) assume instead endogenous fertility (i.e. that parents have some control over the size of their progeny) and a linear tax system; they show that it is generally optimal to diversify the tax treatment of children from that of childrenspeci…c goods (taxing the former when subsidising the latter and viceversa). Both the above contributions employ a speci…c household utility function -a generalised utilitarian whereby the welfare levels of the parents and of the children are added up to yield total household utility. Balestrino et al. (2000) use a general utility function, take fertility to be endogenous, and assume that the tax system comprises both non-linear income and children taxes, as well as linear commodity taxes; they …nd that fertility choices should be undistorted in the speci…c sense that the distortions created by the taxation of children-speci…c goods must be compensated by those induced by the taxation of children. 1 Since there is by now a convincing evidence that fertility is endogenous (see e.g. Dasgupta, 2000 , and the references therein), it seems reasonable to take it as our working hypothesis (although we will sometime compare our results with those that would arise under the assumption of exogenous fertility). Unfortunately, none of the above contributions based on the endogenous fertility assumption is able to produce a clearly positive answer to the question from which we started, namely if there is an optimal taxation-based rationale for subsidising children. In this note, we illustrate a set of conditions under which is socially desirable to subsidise family size when the latter is endogenous, and we argue that such desirability is critically sensitive to the form of the tax system. We do not restrict the form of the family utility function, and focus …rst on a linear tax system and then on a mixed tax system, i.e. one in which both linear and non-linear taxes exist. The main di¤erence between the two tax regimes is that in the former non-income taxes play a substantial equitative role; the redistributive impact of the linear income tax is somewhat limited, and it has to be supplemented by the other policy instruments.
When instead the income tax is non-linear, it becomes the main instrument for redistribution, and the role of non-income taxes is mostly that of increasing the e¢ciency of the …scal structure by discouraging false representations of preferences -see Edwards et al. (1994) and Nava et al. (1996) .
The note is structured as follows. Sec. 2 sets up a model of family choice with household "production" of children. Sec. 3 establishes some benchmark results. In Sec. 4 we discuss the desirability of subsidising family size under changing assumptions on the form of the tax system. Sec. 5 sums up and concludes.
A model of family choice
Consider an economy inhabited by a large number of households, subdivided into two groups.
These groups are identi…ed by their market ability, which is as usual normalised to equal the wage rate, w i ; i = 1; 2. We take it that w 2 > w 1 ; that is the members of group 2 have higher ability. There is the same number of households in each group, and group size is normalised to unity. Preferences are identical. Each household is made of two varieties of individuals, parents and children. Parents behave as a unitary entity 2 who consumes C units of an adult consumption good, and has a "quantity" N of children. All children are identical and are treated identically by the parents (Willis 1973) ; their "quality" (of life) Q is a function of a children-speci…c good z and home-time h. 3 Realistically, we assume that there are minimum levels of z and h necessary to guarantee the survival of a child. Letting z and h denote these levels, we can set the scale of Q in such a way that Q(z; h) = 0; the function Q is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale in (z ¡ z; h ¡ h). Parental utility is thus given by
2 Assuming otherwise would introduce additional complexities in the model, without changing the main insights we are trying to convey. For a recent treatment of the …scal treatment of the couple, see Apps and Rees (1999) .
Production is linear, and uses labour as the only input: units are chosen in such a way that all producer prices are unity. Consumer prices are p and q for C and z, respectively. The tax structure consists of a lump-sum transfer T , a marginal rate of income tax t; commodity taxes p ¡ 1 > 0 and q ¡ 1 > 0 (or subsidies, p ¡ 1 < 0 and q ¡ 1 < 0) and a child bene…t, G < 0 (or tax, We also adhere to the standard assumption that gross income can be observed (while hours worked or wage rates cannot), so that the government can tax it non-linearly. Moreover, we add the natural assumption that the fertility level can be observed in a non-anonimous way, i.e.
the government knows how many children each household type has; this means that children too can be taxed at a non-linear rate. We represent the resulting mixed tax system using income-contingent, piece-wise linear tax rates for the non-linear taxes, i.e. by making t; T and
The time endowment is normalised to unity, so that the time constraint is,
where L is the labour supply. Substituting the time constraint into the budget constraint, we can then write the latter as
with t i = t; T i = T and G i = G, all i, when the tax system is linear. Note that the term in brackets on the l.h.s. of (3) is the marginal cost of a child and has therefore a natural interpretation as the "price of quantity". We will denote this price by
Note that ¼ i depends not only on the child bene…t G i , but also on the consumer price of the children-speci…c good, q and on the marginal rate of income tax, t i . The non-income taxes a¤ect the actual expenditure on children, while the income tax a¤ects the value of the time devoted to child attention (and therefore subtracted to the labour supply). Indeed, we can de…ne the e¤ective tax rate on children as
if µ i < 0, then a child is a tax asset to its parents; if µ i > 0, it is a tax liability.
We can now characterise family behaviour in terms of …rst order conditions. Maximising
(1) subject to (3) 5 by choice of C, z, h and N 6 yields:
where ® denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. Solving (6) plus the constraint, we derive the ordinary demand functions for C and z, the amount of time devoted to each children h, and the fertility level N, as a function of the policy parameters. Substituting these back in the maximand gives us the indirect utility function v(p; q; t; T; G). For future reference, note that the household's problem has a standard dual representation, in which expenditure is minimised subject to the attainment of a given utility level. The solution to this problem will give us the compensated demands C and z, the compensated use of time h, and the compensated fertility level N. Importantly, note that, due to the non-linearity of the budget constraints, the duality relations apply with a modi…cation: the usual properties (Slutsky equation, symmetry, negativity of the own-price term, etc.) hold for C; Z = zn, H = hn and N and not for C; z, h and N. 7 So, we have for instance that Z G = N q by symmetry, and so on.
For future use, we need some assumption on how consumer choices react to changes in the wage rate, which is the only parameter varying across households. It seems natural to impose the following
5 Note that parental choices are, in principle, restricted also from a fertility "ceiling" (N cannot exceed some physiological maximum). However, when the fertility constraint is binding, the problem becomes one of exogenous fertility; hence, we will always assume that it is slack. 6 In line with virtually the whole literature on endogenous fertility, we assume that N is a continuous variable, and that there is no uncertainty. This practice is innocuous as long as one is not interested in the timing of births, but only in the number of them. It can be rationalized by taking the parents to be risk-neutral and viewing N as the expectation of a continuous approximation to the underlying discrete distribution of births.
A1(i) simply says that high-ability households have higher adult consumption; given a wellbehaved labour supply curve, normality of C is enough to guarantee this. A1(ii) says that low-ability households have more children than the high-ability ones; given that ¼ is increasing in w, normality of N guarantees this (moreover, there is a large empirical literature which con…rms that high-earners tend to have few children -see e.g. Cigno 1994 for some references).
Establishing benchmark results
Our main focus in this paper is on second-best optimal tax structures when the government has a redistributive objective. It is illuminating, however, to establish …rst some benchmark results, which we do by brie ‡y discussing …rst-best policy and e¢ciency-oriented second-best taxes. The characterisation of …rst best turns out to be useful for clary…ng the role of the assumption that fertility is endogenous, while that of e¢cient second-best taxes helps us to understand that the rationale for child subsidies is entirely based on the presence of a redistributive objective.
First-best policy
As we said, it is de…nitely possible to defend the assumption of endogenous fertility on grounds of its empirical soundness. But, we will also demonstrate that it avoids the risk of stacking the cards too obviously in favour of children subsidisation.
To see this, suppose that …rst-best lump-sum transfers are available. Then, all distortionary taxation is redundant; we will have t = p¡1 = q¡1 = G = 0 at the optimum. If the government maximises a quasi-concave social welfare function with a purely redistributive objective, the optimum clearly requires that high-wage families are taxed and low-wage families are subsidised.
There obviously is no reason to favour large families, because there is no sense in which large families have necessarily low utility. Then, if a rationale for subsidisation arises in a secondbest world, it will not be because it re ‡ects a built-in property of the model. Assume now, for the sake of the argument, that fertility is exogenous, and write the budget constraint in the following way:
The last term on the r.h.s represents the …xed costs of having children. Importantly, these are not avoidable by the parents, since they cannot decide how large N must be. Pre-tax income is e¤ectively w ¡ N (z + wh), not w alone. And, the larger is N, the lower is pre-tax income.
Then, …rst-best taxation will clearly favour large families; indeed if N 2 is much larger than N 1 , it may well be the case that redistribution will be in favour of the high-wage families.
Of course, this argument will carry over to a second-best setting: it will always be desirable to support households with many children, because of the higher costs they face. This makes clear that exogenous fertility models like that of Cremer et al. (2000) make a case for children subsidisation which is essentially based on the horizontal equity argument that parents should be compensated for the costs of procreation. 8
Second-best taxes when only e¢ciency matters
Let us ignore for a moment the di¤erences in earning ability, and suppose that all households are identical (earn the same wage). If we normalise by imposing t = 0 and set T at some predermined level T > 0; to be interpreted as a revenue requirement, we can then choose optimally the indirect taxes and the tax on children by maximizing the indirect utility of a representative consumer under the constraint that (p ¡ 1)C + (q ¡ 1)Z + GN = T : This is basically a Ramsey-type problem, and the standard result that all commodities (including children) should be distorted uniformly holds. It is more instructive, however, to look at the simple formulas that arise when we assume that all cross-price substitution e¤ects are zero and there are no income e¤ects -the well-know inverse elasticity rules, which yield expressions for the ad valorem tax rates: 9
where ¾ < 0 is some common proportionality factor, and " k is the own-price elasticity of good k (note that we used that " Z = " z in this simpli…ed setting). Notice …rst that since all elasticities are negative, all tax rates are positive: subsidisation of children is ruled out when the government only pursues an e¢ciency objective. Also the e¤ective tax rate on children µ -see above -will necessarily be positive; children will always be a tax liability. The way in which the tax burden is allocated among the three tax bases depends crucially on the child-rearing technology. If the elasticity of substitution between z and h is very low (approaching a Leontief technology), then the demand for z is insensitive to price changes; to minimize distortions, all the tax burden will therefore be on z: If the elasticity of substitution between z and h is very high (approaching a linear technology), then the demand for z is extremely sensitive to price changes, and therefore the tax burden will be divided between C and N; if N is less own-price elastic than C, then fertility will be heavily taxed. Finally, if N were …xed, i.e. fertility were exogenous, the optimum would be reached by setting G = T =N > 0, because when a source of lump-sum taxation is available, no distortionary taxation is used. This allows us to establish that no case for subsidisation of children can be made on e¢ciency grounds, no matter whether fertility is endogenous or exogenous.
4 Second-best taxes with a redistributive objective
Moving now to our main task, we take in turn the case in which the tax system is fully linear, and the one in which it is of the so-called mixed variety (non-linear income and children taxes plus linear indirect taxes). Clearly, the redistributive impact of non-linear income tax schedules is much stronger; we therefore expect non-income taxes to have a minor role as fas as equity is concerned when the tax structure is mixed. This is indeed the case; it is well-know from recent important contributions - Edwards et al. (1994) and Nava et al. (1996) -that commodity taxes supplementing a non-linear income tax are only helpful inasmuch as they help to relax the information-related constraints restricting the policy design. We will see that the same applies to the tax on children. On the contrary, non-income taxes play a substiantial equitative role when the the tax structure is entirely linear -see Myles (1995, ch. 4) for an overview of the large literature on this issue. We shall see that the di¤erent relevance of non-income taxes in terms of redistributive impact is crucial in determining whether children should be subsidised or not.
Linear tax system
In this case, it is customary to normalise the tax system by setting t = 0. Then, the government chooses p; q; G and T so as to maximise a Paretian, quasi-concave social welfare function subject to a revenue constraint:
where r is the revenue requirement (possibly zero).In order to characterise the tax rules, we de…ne the net social marginal utility of income, inclusive of the e¤ects of a marginal increase in income on revenue, as
where W i = @W=@v i is the welfare weight and ¹ is the Lagrange multiplier for the government's budget constraint (the social marginal cost of taxation).
Optimal tax rules 10
From the …rst order condition for the optimal choice of T , we get, using (10),
where the symbol # denotes an average value. That is, the marginal social value of raising one euro of revenue lump-sum, b # , should equal its marginal cost, 1. The optimal choice of p, q and G is instead governed by the many-person Ramsey tax rule, which is derived from the …rst order conditions in a standard way, using (11), the Slutsky equations and the symmetry of the Slutsky term:
The term on the l.h.s. is the percentage change in the hicksian demand due to taxation (the so-called "discouragement index"); instead
where cov denotes covariance, is the redistributive characteristic of good k, whose value exceeds (falls short of) unity if k is consumed prevalently from the high-wage (low-wage) households.
So, the rules require that the commodity taxes are designed in such a way that the consumption of commodity k is encouraged (discouraged) if it is mostly demanded by the poor (rich).
Unfortunately, the many-person Ramsey rules are not easy to interpret in terms of policy recommendations since they give the e¤ect of taxation on quantities, and not on prices. In order to conclude that fertility should be, let us say, encouraged by the tax system, we should prove that r N > 1. However, we cannot do that at this level of generality, as can be easily appreciated by looking at the expression for b -(10) above. And even if we were able to do that, we still could not say that the encouragement of fertility should be carried out by setting. e.g. G < 0 and q < 1, since the rule for N in (12) can accommodate several di¤erent combinations of the tax rates. To gain more insight into the matter, we will simplify the structure of the model.
The policy mix
A simpli…cation commonly used in optimal tax theory (which we already referred to above) is to assume that all taxed good have a zero cross-substitution e¤ect, and that there is no income e¤ect. Then, the rules for C and Z in (12) reduce to many-person inverse elasticity rules:
where " C and " z denotes the own-price market elasticity of C and z (we have already mentioned that " z = " Z when there are no cross-price e¤ects and no income e¤ects). The analogous expression for N is somewhat more involved because the price of quantity is household-speci…c (the wage rate as well as the uses of z and h vary across households); letting n i denote the proportion of children of the i-th family over the economy-wide number of children, we have
where the l.h.s. can be interpreted as a weighted average of the household-speci…c own-price elasticities of N.
Using (14), we can then immediately say that C should be taxed (that is, p > 1) if r C < 1 and taxed otherwise; the same holds for Z, and, by (15), for N. There being no income e¤ects, also the expression for b becomes simpler, reducing to
With a quasi-concave welfare function and decreasing marginal utility of income, we can then say that b is decreasing in w -again ruling out backward-bending labour supply curves. Then, Assumption 1 tells us that
The optimal policy mix includes therefore a tax on adult consumption, q > 1, and a child bene…t; G < 0. 11 We are thus able to con…rm the children should indeed be subsidised by 1 1 We reasonably assume that ¼ > 0 for all possible values of q and G.
a linear optimal tax system when family size is endogenous. The intuition for this result is straightforward. The government is interested in redistributing towards the low-wage family;
since the linear income tax has a mild redistributive impact, the government's aim is largely pursued using non-income taxes. Then, since low-wage family consume less and have more children, the tax system involves high taxes on consumption and subsidies for children.
The e¤ective tax treatment of children
Can we conclude from the above discussion that children are necessarily tax assets to their parents under a linear tax system? The answer is no, we can't. To make statements of this sort, we need to sign the e¤ective tax rate on children µ i = (q ¡ 1)z i + G (recall that t = 0).
Then, we need to establish the tax treatment of the children-speci…c goods. Now, the sign of (1 ¡ r Z ) is ambiguous, but by de…nition of Z and A(ii) we have that
Hence, for istance, if the elasticity of the use of z w.r.t. to w falls short of the elasticity of quantity N w.r.t. to w; then r Z > 1 and therefore q < 1: Thus, we have that µ i < 0: children are a tax asset to their parents. That will most likely be the case when the child-rearing technology exhibits a low elasticity of substitution, for then an increase in the wage rate might reduce the use of both h and z, so that @z=@w will be less than zero. However, if the use of z increases rapidly as w goes up (because the technology is characterised by a high elasticity of substitution), it may well be that @z=@w is positive and large enough to make also @Z=@w positive; then, we have q > 1 at the optimum. In that case, the sign of µ i remains ambiguous.
The intuition behind the above reasoning is again linked to the need to perform redistribution largely using non-income taxes. Children have two dimensions, quantity and quality (approximated here by out-of-pocket expenditure, z). Along the dimension of quantity they are a necessity, but along the dimension of quality they might be a luxury. If that is the case, the government subsidises quantity and taxes quality; depending on which dimension prevails, the overall impact for the families may be positive (children become a tax asset) or negative (children become a tax liability).
Mixed tax system
When the income tax is allowed to be non-linear, the policy design is restricted by the presence of information-related constraints. Since the government is choosing group-speci…c income tax parameters, it must guard itself against the risk that households belonging to one group might prefer the tax treatment intended for the members of the other group (Mirrlees, 1971; Stiglitz, 1982; Boadway and Keen, 2000) . This means that the tax rates have to be chosen under incentive-compatibility constraints such that the households self-select, i.e. reveal their true identity by choosing the tax treatment e¤ectively intended for them. In principle, it is possible that high-wage households have to be prevented from masquerading as low-wage ones as well as the other way round. However, imposing the standard "single-crossing" condition that the indi¤erence curves of the high-ability household are everywhere ‡atter than that of the lowability ones in the (pre-tax income, post-tax income)-space will result in only one constraint at the time to be binding; adding the assumption that the government wishes to redistribute from high-to low-ability households will guarantee that the only binding constraint is the one ruling out that high-ability households may choose the tax package intended for the other type.
High-wage households misrepresenting their type are called "mimickers".
It may be useful to work out the mimicker's problem in some detail. Note …rst that, since the government observes only pre-tax incomes (not hours worked or wage rates), the mimicker can adjust its labour supply in order to earn the same pre-tax income as the mimicked; as a consequence, it will have the same disposable income (the tax liability is the same), but it will work less than the true low-wage household (the mimicker's wage rate is higher). Moreover, since also N i is observable, the mimicker will also have to select the same number of children as the true low-ability households to avoid giving away its identity. That means that the mimicker has no choice of time allocation: it must work 12 b L 2 = w 1 L 1 =w 2 hours and devote
hours of attention to each children. The mimicker's problem will therefore be that of
taking the time allocation as given. This yields …rst order conditions
Solving these together with the constraint will yield the optimal choices for C and z; substituting these back into the maximand will give us indirect utility, b v 2 = v(t 1 ; T 1 ; q; G 1 ).
Optimal tax rules
Under a mixed tax system, it is convenient to normalise by setting one of the commodity tax rates to zero; we choose p ¡ 1 = 0. Then, the government chooses q; G i ; t i and T i so as to
where the …rst constraint is the self-selection constraint and the second is the revenue constraint (the Lagrange multipliers are indicated in curly brackets). We do not provide the (standard) characterisation of the optimum income tax (the interested reader is referred to Edwards et al. 1994 and Nava et al. 1996) , but simply give the formulae for the indirect tax rate and the tax on children: 13
Expression (22) characterises the optimal tax on the child-speci…c good. The l.h.s. is a (variant of) the discouragement index de…ne above and represents therefore the marginal cost of using non-income taxes; at the optimum, this cost equals the marginal bene…t, as given by the term on the r.h.s. This latter term represents the relaxation of the self-selection constraint, and its action is based on the fact that the mimicker normally has a di¤erent optimal bundle than the mimicked, despite having the same pre-tax income and the same disposable income.
If, for example, z 1 > b z 2 , implying that the mimicker uses less of z than the true low-wage type, than it is optimal to encourage Z (this follows because¸, ¹ and b ® 2 are all positive); that is, the use of z is distorted in a way which is detrimental for the mimicker.
Expression (23) has the same interpretation. The important di¤erence is however that the gain in terms of self-selection is zero. That follows because the mimicker has the same number of children as the mimicked (N 1 = b N 2 ) and therefore distorting fertility choices has no screening power; as a consequence, G will be set so as to totally o¤set the distortionary impact of the to T i to simplify, and then applying Roy's identity, the Slutsky properties outlined above and the fact that
tax on Z: Balestrino et al. (2000) discuss in detail the implication of this policy prescription for various aspects of the tax system. Here, we will simply focus on whether children should be subsidised or not. Let us take the simpli…ed version of the model in which all cross-substitution e¤ects are taken to be zero (and there are no income e¤ects). That assumption allowed us to make a neat case for subsidisation of children under a fully linear tax system. Now, it leads to the conclusion that G i = 0, as can be readily inferred from (23). Therefore, the rationale for children subsidisation disappears completely; in the presence of a general income tax, nonincome taxes are only helpful inasmuch as they have screening power, and the tax on children has none.
Finally, we discuss brie ‡y the question whether children should be a tax asset. Although family size should be tax-neutral under a mixed tax system (with zero cross-substitution e¤ects), the e¤ective tax treatment of children depends on all policy instruments. It is indeed easy to see that if both household types face a positive marginal rate of income tax, and purchases of Z are subsidised, then children are indeed tax assets (for then
Unfortunately, the income tax schedule in mixed tax sytems is di¢cult to characterise; Nava et al. (1996) discuss in some detail the sign of the income marginal tax rate and argue that under mild conditions we should expect that incomes are taxed at the margin, and therefore the opportunity cost of child-rearing is reduced, for both household types. If that is the case, we only need to check the conditions under which there will be a subsidy on Z. Recall that the mimicker has more non-working time and the same number of children as the true type-1 household; hence b h 2 > h. Therefore, if z and h are technological complements in child-rearing, we expect the mimicker to have a higher use of the child-speci…c good, which will consequently be subsidised at the optimum; if z and h are technological substitutes, we expect the mimicker to have a lower use of the child-speci…c good, which will then be taxed at the optimum. Then, we can argue that a low elasticity of substitution between home-time and child-speci…c goods will work in favour of making children tax assets under a mixed tax system (the same was true under a linear tax system, see above in this Section).
Related literature on household production
We modelled family choice using a household production approach. Since there is a small but growing literature on taxation in household production models, it may be of some interest to compare our result with those prevailing in that literature. We have to distinguish two streams of work. First, we have contributions which focus on the home-production of tradeable goods; these include the pioneering work of Sandmo (1990) and more recent papers by Anderberg and Balestrino (2000) and Kleven et al. (2000) . The main …nding of these authors is that there is a case, both on e¢ciency and equity grounds, for taxing inputs into home-production heavily and, correspondingly, for subsidising market substitutes of home-produced commodities.
The rationale for this pattern of taxation is that it would counteract the income tax-induced distortions away from market work towards home-work by encouraging people to buy marketed goods instead of producing them at home. We are not able to con…rm that result in our setting, and, in particular, we do not …nd that the input into the home-production of children z should necessarily be taxed heavily: since there is no market substitute for quantity or quality, the above argument fails to apply.
Indeed, our contribution belongs to a second stream of work, which deals with the homeproduction of non-tradeable goods (for which it makes little sense to talk of market substitutes).
This approach has been pursued by Balestrino et al. (2000) and Cigno and Pettini (2001) , in which the non-tradeable good is interpreted as children as in the present model, and by Kleven (2000) , who employs a very general speci…cation with an arbitrary number of non-tradeable home-produced goods. In this last paper, the author argues that, when the government only pursues e¢ciency, the pattern of taxation for marketed input goods depends crucially on the elasticity of substitution between the input themselves and home-time. This result is not directly comparable with ours, because children, unlike other non-tradeable home-produced goods, are observable and therefore taxable; however, we can notice that we indeed found that the elasticity of substitution between the inputs of the child-rearing technology plays a crucial role in determining the tax structure when only e¢ciency matters (see Section 3), and also in determining whether children are a tax asset or a tax liability under a redistributive objective.
Concluding remarks
Several authors have recently investigated the question whether a welfare-maximising government should devise its tax policy in such a way that children are subsidised. For the case when fertility is taken to be endogenous, a clear answer has not been provided. In this note, we endeavoured to shed more light on the issue.
We found that when redistribution is accomplished mostly using non-income taxes, there is indeed a case for subsidising the number of children. The reason is simple: poor families tend to have more children, and it is therefore desirable to redistribute in favour of large households (not because they are large, but because they are less well-o¤). Interestingly, this result does not depend on the horizontal equity-based arguments usually employed in the exogenous fertility literature; it is instead deeply rooted in a vertical equity requirement, i.e. the maximisation of a quasi-concave social welfare function. Indeed, it is for this very fact that the desirability of subsidising family size vanishes when redistribution is accomplished mostly via the income tax;
in that case, vertical equity is satis…ed without having recourse to child subsidies.
In either case, the tax treatment of family size alone is not enough to determine whether a child should, on the whole, be a tax asset to his or her parents. Children a¤ect parental wellbeing in di¤erent ways, depending on how many they are (their quantity) and how well they are treated (their quality); moreover, their cost includes an out-of-pocket expenditure as well as the shadow-value of the time not supplied to the labour market. Therefore, it is only by determining the signs of all the policy instruments that we can ascertain whether an extra-child increases or reduces the total tax bill of his or her parents. We found that the elasticity of substitution between goods and time in the child-rearing technology is an important determinant of whether children are tax assets or tax liabilities.
